Abstract This paper seeks to recover and establish the distinct (and distinctly) institutionalist social ontology that underpins social constructivism as an approach to political economic analysis. It views social constructivism as a profoundly normative mode of political inquiry which seeks to discern, interrogate and elucidate the contingency of social, political and economic change restoring politics (broadly understood) to processes and practices typically seen to be inevitable, necessary and non-negotiable. More controversially, perhaps, it also sees social constructivism, after both Berger and Luckmann and Searle, as ontologically institutionalist. Social constructivism, it is argued, has its origins in the attempt to establish the ontological distinctiv T and the environment (both natural and social) in which they find themselves and to its characteristic emphasis on the ideational mediation of that relationship. That in turn leads it to a particular type of analytic purchase on political economic realities, reflected in its distinctive emphasis on interpretive ambiguity, the social construction of political and economic imperatives and on disequilbrium. The argument is illustrated and developed further through an elucidation of the implications of such a social constructivism for the analysis of the period of crisis through which we now acknowledge ourselves to be living.
and difficult to pin down precisely. It means different things to different authors (and sometimes, seemingly, to the same author even in the pages of a single contribution), it covers a multitude of differing (and at times seemingly incommensurate) positions and, even in what are taken to be its defining texts, it often lacks a clearly stated set of core claims. It is also treated, by its advocates, admirers and detractors alike, as a normative theory, an ontology, an epistemology and (if more rarely) a methodology.
In what follows my aim is to attempt to inject some clarity into this confusion. The task is, however, ambitious and fraught with perils. Constructivism is difficult to specify precisely because, in the end, it does mean different things to different people and, to compound the problem, the content of such meanings has itself changed over time. There is no escaping this; nor is there is anything inherently wrong with it it is just how things are. Inevitably, then, some self-declared constructivists will empathise more closely with the account of constructivism that I offer here than others. And that perhaps makes it important to explain how I have gone about the task of clarifying and articulating as clearly and sympathetically as I can the constructivist position that I here outline and ultimately seek to defend.
Constructivism as ontology
The approach adopted is a simple one: to be a social constructivist I contend, is to emphasise (having, ideally, reflected systematically upon) the process of social construction. As such, the origins and defining analytical features of social constructivism should in principal be traceable to, and identifiable from within, the ontology of social construction on which its name at least would suggest it is ostensibly predicated.
It is, accordingly, with Berger and Luckmann of such an ontology,
The Social Construction of Reality (1966) and its more recent restatement and development by the analytical philosopher John R. Searle (1995 Searle ( , 2005 Searle ( , 2010 ) that I begin. 1 In so doing and in keeping with the emphasis in both on ontology, it is perhaps useful to begin w B L T "
appertaining to phenomena that we recognise as having a being independent of our (1966: 13) .
Two things are immediately interesting, striking even, about this definition. First, it is remarkably close to that typically offered by philosophical realists such as Bhaskar (as, for instance, in Bhaskar 1979; see also Marsh and Furlong 2002; Sayer 2000) , but with one difference the second point. The difference is that realists invariably posit a reality independent of our knowledge or understanding of it whereas constructivists (at least on the basis of this definition) emphasise the independence of reality from human volition. The distinction might seem trivial, but in fact it is extremely important for it allows constructivists to identify a category of things (like money, marriage and, indeed, the government) that (they contend) exist and draw whatever properties they have from our (collective) knowledge and understanding of them. The ten euro note in my pocket is only a ten euro note (as distinct from a scruffy piece of paper) insofar as it is regarded as such its value is not intrinsic to it as a piece of paper and is derived principally (if not quite exclusively) from a status bestowed upon it socially. Its materiality, its physical facticity, gives us no clue to its social significance or role. That it is a piece of money (as distinct from merely a piece of paper) is a social and not a physical, natural or, in " This does not make it any less real (a fact that I will rely on when I present it at the bar to settle my tab later), but it does mean that its reality derives in significant part precisely from the knowledge and understanding that I and others have of it (as money). As such, its existence is not (pace the realist 1 This, I think, is a logical move which can be defended in its own terms. However, it is also reassuring that Berger and Luckmann and, indeed, Searle, though rarely discussed in any detail, are typically cited, in effect, as inspirational philosophical under-labourers by prominent social constructivists in precisely the texts most often regarded as defining of the approach (see, for instance and inter alia, Wendt 1992 Wendt , 1999 Adler 1997; Schmidt 2008 It is Searle (1995 Searle ( , 2010 , however, who takes this furthest. His own definition of reality is very similar to that of Berger and Luckmann. It leads him to differentiate, in (i) those things that can be said to exist independently of our thought (natural or brute facts); (ii) those things which, on a routine day-to-day basis may exist largely independently of our conscious thought but whose very existence in the first place is a product of human thought and volition and whose specific facticity today bears clear traces of this irredeemably social origin and evolution (many institutional facts and the practices to which they give rise, such as voting, are of this kind); and (iii) those things (such as a self-fulfilling prophecy or a consensus) whose very facticity is a product and reflection of our thought and which endure only for as long as our thoughts are of a particular kind (the self-fulfilling prophecy is of course shattered by the very realisation that it is or just might be a self-fulfilling prophecy). Social constructivists, unremarkably perhaps, are more interested in the second and third categories of facticity identified above. For it is only these that can be said to have been socially constructed. Thus, what differentiates their social ontology from others is its emphasis on both the existence of social facts and the distinction between social facts and natural or brute facts the distinctive facticity of the social, in other words.
The socially constitutive nature of institutional facts C institutionalism. Again, it is Searle who sets this out most clearly, though once more he builds directly and explicitly on Berger and Luckmann in so doing. It is with their account that we should perhaps start. Central to it is the notion of habitualisation.
As they suggest, is subject to habitualisation. Any action that is repeated frequently becomes cast into a pattern, which can then be reproduced with an economy of effort and which, ipso facto, is apprehended by its performer as Such patterning is invariably indicative of the existence of institutions.
Indeed, as they go on to explain, institutionalisation occurs whenever there is a (1966: 71, 72) . This is a crucial observation. For what makes such typification reciprocal is language (and the shared or inter-subjective understandings to which it gives rise). Language is, in effect, the medium in and through which that reciprocity is established and maintained and, accordingly, the medium in and through which the simultaneously enabling and constraining qualities of institutions are affected (in the regularisation of the practices to which they give rise). As this suggests, institutions are characterised by both historicity and control (their contribution to the regularisation of social practices within a specific domain, locus or setting an institutional context). For Berger and Luckmann, such control is intrinsic to institutions. As they put it, i external and (1966: 76) . That they do so, and thereby achieve such an effect, is principally through the assignment of roles to actors and the codification (both formally and informally) of such roles through the establishment and reproduction of a series of rules and associated expectations (norms of appropriate and inappropriate behaviour, contextualised modes of rationality and so forth). Institutions, in other words, exist only in and through the practices to which they might be seen to give rise; though such practices (for example, specific instances of institutionalised patriarchy) are sadly (at least in this instance) all too real, institutions themselves (patriarchy, in this example) are revealed as analytical 2 The I are built out of norms and conventions and those norms and conventions, in so far as they are sustained, may lend a certain order, even predictability, to (institutonalised) social interaction. But they never eliminate the space for contingency. All norms and conventions are ambiguous; all norms and conventions are contestable; and all norms and conventions evolve over time through the daily resolution of ambiguity in the production of behaviour and, over the longer-term, through their contestation and renegotiation.
concepts which help up make sense of such practices. They are, rather than real per se (see also Hay 2014; Jessop 2014; Parsons 2015 (1966: 36) . Money, in other words, only exists in the exchanges to which it gives rise and their consequences; in the absence of the practices it makes possible, the institution has no meaningful existence. The social is comprised of a series of such practices; but the very condition of existence of these practices is the socially constitutive properties of the institutions out of which they arise and from which they derive their meaning.
Finally, Searle has some very prescient and important things to say about the specificity of institutional (as distinct from merely social) facts (the former are, as he argues, a sub-class of the latter). In addition to the suggestion that institutional facts are constitutive of social space, in that the opportunities they provide serve to structure and configure that space for actors, he argues that all institutional facts derive ultimately from the attempt to deliver some kind of social function. And, as he puts it, ction to the creation of institutional facts is the imposition of a collectively recognised status to (Searle 1995, 41; see also 2005 , 2010 . This leads him to infer that all institutional facts are essentially X Y C X Y C relevant institutional context. An example might help to clarify the point: X (this piece of paper marked with a cross in this way) counts as Y (a vote for this candidate and this party rather than another combination of candidate and party) in C (the context of this particular electoral contest taking place within this particular first-past-the-post single member district electoral system). There is, as Searle himself notes, a certain magic performed here (1995: 45) as the physical object X, the piece of paper ceremonially deposited in the ballot box, is transformed into a socially and (here, above all) politically meaningful Y (a vote cast in an ostensibly democratic electoral process for one candidate rather than another). In this process and very many others like it, things (pieces of paper and the like) come first to stand for or signify but ultimately to stand in for or become something other than themselves (a certain multiple of a unit of exchange, a vote and so forth).
Indeed, one might extend " e extent of the institutional conjuring trick required in cases such as these is at least in part responsible for the highly ritualised and ceremonial character of the process by which, say, votes are cast and counted (see Faucher & Hay 2015 ).
An important implication of all of this is that institutional facts only exist by virtue of human agreement. As such, they are socially and politically contingent; rather more socially and politically contingent, in fact, than most institutionalists today acknowledge (a point to which we return presently). But this, of course, does not mean that they can simply be willed away. In what follows my aim is to explore a little more thoroughly the still largely I might be seen, in the process, to be offering and advancing a constructivist institutionalism (as, to some extent, in Hay 2006) . But that would be a misreading.
My aim is in fact is a subtly different one to reveal something of the character of the institutionalism that I see as inherent, intrinsic and already present within social constructivism. I seek to draw attention to and to explore the implications of something that already exists, rather than to make the case for something new. (often where it might not otherwise be apparent) the political authoring of institutional, institutionalised and institutionalising processes and the difference that actors make to institutional dynamics. It seeks, in other words, to discern and uncover the politics in institutional design, institutional reproduction and institutional change. And it sees politics as intrinsic to institutions precisely because it sees institutions, as we have seen, as conditional and contingent upon human agreement.
Constructivism as institutionalism constructivist institutionalism
As this perhaps suggests, constructivism is characterised too by a distinctive (if nonetheless inclusive) conception of politics and the political which it associates with contingency rather than fate, indeterminacy rather than predictability and social construction rather than natural necessity. Politics is, in short, the realm of the socially contingent and institutions are, by their very nature, socially contingent and hence irredeemably political (Hay 2007 ).
This emphasis upon contingency it derives directly from the ontology of institutional (as distinct from natural or brute) facts; and it puts constructivism at odds with other institutionalisms. These tend either to squeeze politics out of institutional analysis or reduce political conduct to rational and/or norm-driven behaviour. In such conceptions politics, far from being open-ended, creative and contingent, is a source of determinacy, predictability and equilibrating dynamics. This constructivists challenge. In so doing they set out a rather different and distinctive understanding of the relationship between institutionally-embedded actors and the institutional environments in which they find themselves and which serve to configure the opportunities and constraints they must negotiate.
For constructivists social and political realities are at least partially constituted by actors through the subjective and inter-subjective understandings they develop to make sense of their experiences and to orient themselves towards their environment and through the behaviours to which such understandings give rise. This leads to an institutionalism characterised by six distinguishing features:
1. A focus on the processes of institutionalisation, de-institutionalisation and reinstitutionalisation rather than on institutions per se;
2. An understanding of ideationally (with institutionally-situated actors orienting themselves towards their institutional environment through a series of subjective and intersubjective understandings, cognitions and normative dispositions); 3. A characteristic focus on institutional change as politically contingent;
4. An understan interests and normative orientations as socially constructed rather than materially given; 5. A rejection of any presupposition of institutional equilibrium and an acute sensitivity to the importance both of moments of crisis and their political constitution (though, probabilistically, these may be infrequent, they are likely to prove enduring in their significance);
6. An inductive approach to process tracing calling for a political anthropology of institutionally-situated action and change.
In the final sections of this paper I look at each of these six tenets of constructivism in a little more detail, illustrating each with respect to our understanding of crises in general and the global financial crisis in particular.
From institutions to institutional practices: a praxiological approach
The first defining tenet of constructivism as an institutionalism is already strongly prefigured in Berger and Luckmann and " common emphasis on the primacy of process in the understanding of institutional facts and institutional practices.
Constructivists are typically far less interested in detailing, mapping and describing structurally the form institutions might be seen to take than they are in describing, analysing and elucidating the always on-going process of constitution and reconstitution in and through which institutional practices both reaffirm and, at the same time, contribute to the evolution of institutions and institutional complexes (like patriarchy and the state).
This emphasis on practice and process, rather than structure and institution, derives, arguably, from two sources. The first is a certain perhaps characteristic suspicion on the part of constructivists that institutions and, in particular, institutional complexes For research on the global financial crisis this would entail a focus on: (i) the pathological/disequilibrating interaction between capitalist institutional configurations and particular growth strategies in the period before the crisis; (ii) the identification and analysis of the institutionalised rationalities in and through which such cumulatively destabilising practices became habitualised; and (iii) the contested politics of crisis definition and response (seen as integral to de-and reinstitutionalisation). It might be pointed out here that at least the first part of this does not appear very obviously constructivist there is not an obvious construction in sight and the process of social construction itself is not the principal object of analysis. Whilst this is true, it is to miss the point somewhat. For this focus on which regards only process and practice as real.
As such, and as this suggests, social constructivism is in fact quite compatible with a range of quite conventional (and seemingly non-constructivist) approaches to elucidating institutional pathologies and mapping these over time.
Ideational mediation and cognitive filtering
A second core tenet of constructivism is t the social, political and, above all, institutional environment in which they find themselves is always and necessarily mediated ideationally. Actors orient themselves to their environment through a veil of ideas understandings, cognitions and normative dispositions.
Some of these are inter-subjective, some subjective. constructivists, it is an ontological truism that actors behaviour is informed not by the actual contours of the institutionally-configured terrain in which they find themselves, but by perceptions and hunches (some well-informed, some poorly informed, some accurate, some inaccurate, many untested and some in principal unknowable in advance of the action to which they give rise). Of course, there is a relationship acquired and filtered by direct and mediated experience between that institutional context on the one hand and the ideas about the institutional context which actors hold and which motivate and inform their behaviour on the other. But that relationship is itself complex, dynamic and contingent. Actors learn from their mistakes but the context in which they try to apply that learning is itself evolving (not least through the evolution of other of parallel learning processes). Consequently, actors never have complete information and the information they acquire through their ongoing encounters with the institutional landscape in which they find themselves is partial and, at very best, retrospectively significant (in that it might well have helped them develop a better strategy at the time they acted).
Yet this is perhaps to focus too narrowly on the subjective. Constructivists also emphasise the inter-subjective character of ideas, noting in particular the way in which norms, conventions and paradigms help actors collectively to resolve much if not all of the interpretive ambiguity inherent in social phenomena. Such intersubjectively held ideas provide, in effect, cognitive templates or filters in and through which collective sense is made of social and political events; and these ideas are frequently embedded institutionally, in the sense that institutional contexts are typically arenas of social interaction in which particular forms of inter-subjective consensus (such as norms, standards, rules, conventions and paradigms) persist and are reproduced.
For research on the global financial crisis this implies a focus on: (i) the ideas (paradigmatic or otherwise) informing economic and related policies in the pre-crisis phase and the (problematic) assumptions about institutions (above all, regulatory institutions) and the determinants of growth on which they were predicated; (ii) the discursive construction of the crisis (as one of debt rather than growth, for instance) and the implications for policy responses and their consequences; and (iii) the possibilities for the contestation of dominant crisis narratives in a context of continued low-or-no growth.
Constructivism thus focuses its analytical attention on the construal and potential reconstrual (through contestation) of the crisis as a crisis of a particular kind (a crisis of debt, a crisis of growth, a financial crisis, a state crisis). It emphasises the contingency of the moment of crisis itself and the political character of the process of interpretive contestation in and through which the ambiguity of the crisis is resolved. It sees that moment of contestation and, above all, the resolution of the interpretive ambiguity as to the nature of the crisis in the consolidation of a dominant crisis narrative as suffused with political power. Success in the narration of the crisis is, for constructivists then, an index of political power. It is likely to have enduring political and economic implications: a politics based on construing the crisis as one of public debt will have very different redistributive consequences from a politics based on construing the crisis as one of growth for instance (Hay 2013) .
The politically contingent character of institutions
A third core tenet of constructivism is that institutional change is profoundly and necessarily political and, accordingly, politically contingent. Indeed, perhaps the principal task of a constructivist approach to institutions is to reveal and draw analytic attention to that politics and, in the process, to demonstrate such political contingency, especially where it might not otherwise be clear (as, for instance, when contingent institutional facts are naturalised and presented as non-negotiable).
There are a number of elements to this. Whilst ideas and ideational systems (policy paradigms, norms, conventions, approaches to the construction of perceived interests and so forth) are path dependent, they are both constantly changing (even if only iteratively) and prone to more rapid change (in and through challenge and contestation). 
Relativising political motivation: beyond self-interest
Crucially from a genuinely constructivist perspective, 4 cannot be thought to be given materially or, indeed, contextually. Though they invariably draw on a variety of inter-subjective (and hence social) constructions (and, as such, are far from normatively neutral) they are also highly subjective and simply bankers, the working class, public servants and so forth). Relatedly, constructivism cannot afford to, and does not, considerations of self-interest and that actors act the way they do by virtue of a necessarily instrumental disposition towards the environment in which they find themselves.
Thus, from a constructivist perspective, the invariably linked notions of interests as materially given and conduct as narrowly instrumental are simplifying distortions.
Indeed, they are typically part of an analytical rather than a genuine ontology in that they are chosen less for their ontological credibility than for the analytic convenience they afford. For such assumptions make possible, where otherwise it would not be, a deductive mode of reasoning that allows us, in effect, to predict the content of acto voter in a first-past-the-post electoral system, an elite civil servant in a publicly funded bureaucracy and so forth). Such assumptions (though they come in a variety of different forms) dominate institutionalism. Yet the point is that they are starkly incompatible with constructivism.
Their appeal is that they serve to the context in which it arises. But this is to deny agency, contingency and, in the process, the very politics which constructivism seeks to identify and interrogate. 
Challenging the assumption of self-equilibrating institutions
A fifth core tenet of constructivism emerges almost naturally out of the others.
From a constructivist perspective there can be no guarantees, and hence should be no expectation, of institutional equilibrium (not even of dynamic equilibrium). If institutions are understood as contingent upon the social constructions out of which they arise and in and through which they continue to exist and they are also understood as disciplining of practice in an almost Foucauldian way, then they are certainly likely to give rise to path dependent evolutionary tendencies. But there is absolutely no reason to assume that such path dependencies should prove cumulatively stabilising over time rather than cumulatively destabilising. That is something, it seems, the global financial crisis has taught us; but it should not be news to constructivists.
T such a cumulatively destabilising path dependency (see, for instance, Schiller 2000). But the key point is that constructivism is perhaps particularly sensitive and attuned to such disequilibrating dynamics, to moments of crisis and, above all, to their political constitution (and the politics of their constitution). Though, historically, these may be infrequent, their enduring significance trumps their scarcity and warrants close scrutiny.
Yet there is another, more theoretical, reason for characteristic focus on crises and disequilibrium (Hay 1996; Blyth 2002 Blyth , 2013 Widmaier et al. 2007 ). It is disarmingly simple. For, from a constructivist perspective the distinction between equilibrium and disequilibrium is itself an analytical rather than an ontological one. To assume that systems exhibiting path dependence are in dynamic equilibrium is, again, merely a simplifying analytical convenience (and hence a distortion). There is no logical reason to presume that path dependencies are indicative of self-equilibrating tendencies and, as the global financial crisis reminds us all to well, path dependencies are just as likely to be cumulatively destabilising as they are to be self-stabilising (certainly over any significant span of time).
But here a further constructivist insight kicks in. For constructivists, interested as they have always been in moments of crisis, are typically strongly aware of the enduring historical significance of those conjunctures in which it all goes wrong and is all seen to go wrong. Accordingly, their approach to institutional process tracing has arguably always been one that has sought to identify potentially disequilibrating path dependencies and the ideational preconditions of their reproduction over time (such as equilibrium assumptions in prevailing economic orthodoxies). This gives constructivist approaches something of an advantage, particularly now, over most conventional approaches to institutional change which have tended to be built on the basis of more or less stylised equilibrium assumptions. Constructivism, in short, is good in a crisis. how the events were understood at the time is crucial to how they were responded to and, consequently, to how those events came to unfold and, in so doing, acquire their historic significance.
Finally, that a sustained recession is likely to prompt a sense of crisis in a highly predictable way is not a product of any bottom line material determinism. It is, instead, simply indicative of the highly entrenched and deeply institutionalised character of the social conventions in and through which we judge economic performance and hence economic failure. When things go wrong they go wrong because they challenge conventional conceptions of normality violating codified norms which govern our expectations. These norms and the ontological security they provide are social constructs, albeit typically highly institutionalised social constructions. but they are not, in the end, part of the same endeavour and it is important, if we are to understand the rather different forms that they take, to understand that.
Constructivism as a political anthropology of institutional and ideational change
The second issue can be dealt with rather more quickly. In considering the specificity of social constructivism I have tended to focus on it as a profoundly social mode of analysis and one that issues from, as it develops out of, an (institutional) ontology of the social. But it is also profoundly political in a rather distinctive and in fact surprisingly normative way. For, as a mode of analysis it is characterised by one thing more than any other: its aim to identify and reveal the politics in processes that might otherwise be seen as natural or necessary (see also Hacking 1999). Its aim, in other words, is to reveal the contingency and hence the politics inherent in and intrinsic to any and all social processes, particularly those that we have come to see as natural, necessary or non-negotiable and thereby non-contingent and apolitical. To argue that something is socially constructed is, in the end and above all, to argue that it can (and perhaps should) be different from how it is and/or how it is perceived to be. 5 It is, in short, to argue for politics and to politicise the social.
If social constructivism is politicising in this way, then it is also concerned, profoundly, with questions of political power. The preceding analysis has not focused principally on the concept of power (though it has touched upon it at various points). But it could easily be recast in such terms. For crisis and crisis construal is suffused with power. Constructivists, of course, have a distinctive take on power which they see less as a product or reflection of material resources nor as a simple capacity to act in a manner consistent with a set of materially-given interests. Power, for constructivists, is about the capacity to resolve interpretive ambiguity authoritatively and that capacity is arguably nowhere more present and nowhere more important that in the moment of crisis. For in such a context, the powerful are those who prove able (often in the face of considerable opposition) to resolve the ambiguities in the symptoms they seek to narrate by reading them as crisis and of a crisis of a particular kind.
In so doing they seek, and succeed in projecting authoritatively, a framing of the context that shapes how others will in turn interact and orient themselves to the crisis scenario in which they now acknowledge themselves to be. The capacity, in other words, to project interis the key to political power. 
